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1IN THE SUPREME COURT
oF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corpor.ation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

11865

JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT,
Defendant and Respondant,

RESPONDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
.
1

Appellant has correctly characterized the case as being
an action in unlawful detainer which seeks to recover
possession from respondant of real property.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant has correctly stated that Judge Bryant H.
Croft granted summary judgement, after hearing appellant argue its case once in May, 1969, and then after
deciding against appellant, hearing the appellant re-argue
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its case once again in June and once again in Septa b
•

m each instance patiently considerinu
and reconsi'd r,nno
·'
o

what appellant had to say, hut in e.ach instance failin:
to find any basis whatsoever upon which to allow
lant's case to continue.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant's version of the facts is so fraught with
irrelevancies, omissions, inaccuries, and misleading in·
ferences, that it seems best to competely restate the
facts than to try to improve upon appellant's statement
of them.
Prior to June 1964, Ellis J. Robinson, and several
corporations which he controlled became indebted to the
respondant for large sums of money for services ren·
dered over several years next prior hereto. The specific
items of service were so numerous that at a certain point,
when respondant's claim exceeded the obvious ability
of Mr. Robinson to pay, respondant .and Mr. Robinson
simply quit keeping track of the debt.
Hanover Construction Comany was one of Robinson's
companies, which on the first day of June 1964, conveyed
several homes and lots in Oak Hills to Eliza S. Robinson,
wife of Ellis J. Robinson.
One of the lots conveyed to Mrs. Robinson by Han·
over Construction Co. was Lot 1 of Oak Hills, Pl at "H'' '
which respondant and his wife had an interest in acquir·
ing.
On Lot 1 was a beautiful, modern, new, brick veneer
home. It had and has 3,134 square feet of finished living
space, a double gar.age of 330 square feet, and porches,
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patios and balconies of 234 square feet. The lot itself was
an<l is 10,200 square feet. It is located in a neighorhood
which has homes consistently selling for $65,000.00 to
S95,000.00. Based on the minimum costs (then) of
per square foot for living space and $2.50 square
foot for garages, porches, etc., and the lot
of
SlS,000.00, the home had and has a value of at least
S69,102.00. (3,134 X $17.00 plus 330 X $2.50, plus
284 X $2.50, plus $15,000.00) These values are set forth
I carefully in an affidavit on page 199 of the principal
record, which appellant has not, cannot, and dare not
rontrovert, without risking perjury.

l

Doxey Layton Company is a mortgage company doing
business in Salt Lake City, Utah 35 South 500 East . It
had a prior construction mortgage on the subject property
against which it had disbursed a total of $18,749.00
(SS,000.00 plus $7,500.00, plus $4,875.00, plus $448.70,
plus $700.00).
Because of minor prior disputes between Ellis

J.

I Robinson and Doxey Layton Company in other trans-

l actions,
1
1

respondant had come to know Doxey Layton Co.
When respondant expressed a tenative interest in the subject property, Doxey Layton promptly volunteered to
make a $30,000.00 loan on the property if respondant
would take it .as his own home.
When Mr. Robinson said he would transfer title to
the subject property for a credit on his debt, he said that
he would probably accept Doxey Layton's appraisal as a
basis for the credit.
Mr. Melvin Teerlink, an appraiser for Doxey Layton,
undertook the appraisal; and after due study, returned

a written appraisal for $54,000.00 (The amount 1·8
rncn.
tioned in Judge Croft's memorandum decision on
208 of the record). The appraisal was low, but not
low as it seemed in light of the fact that the basement had
not then been finished (as it is now) (at a cost of oier
$6,000.00) in rich hardwood panelling.
Respondant and Ellis J. Robinson agreed that the
property would be deeded to respondant in exchange for
a credit of $54,000.00 minus the $18,749.00 construction
mortgage and minus the approximately $1,850.00 in ac·
crued interest thereon .and and minus a $9,000.00 second
mortgage. Title was
to respondant by Warranty
Deed executed by Eliza S. Robinson on June 29, 1964 and
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on
June 29th, 1964 in Book 2208 .at page 232.
In November 1964 the new mortgage loan wai
ready to close. No-one had even intimated that Beneficial
Life Insurance Company was to be involved, either direct·
ly or indirectly in the making of the loan. Negotiations
were conducted entirely with the Doxey Layton Company.
The closing was very straight forward and simple.
With accruing interest, the pay-off on the construction
mortgage was $20,685.23. There was a partial pay·off
to Oak Hills on a second mortgage of $4,404.69, miscel·
laneous recording and title costs of $107.25, and an
escrow to insure the clearance of a mechanic's lien of
$800.00, leaving $4,002.83 available funds out of the
$30,000.00 lo.an. Respondant drew out $3,108.51 to pay
part of the costs of finishing the basement and left
$894.32 on hand with Doxey Layton to apply against
future monthly installments to become due on the mo rt·
gage. (See page 3 and 4 of the record on case # 174076

on appeal in this court fo:r exact details).

From the exhibits to case

I

# 160928'

which is also a

; part of the record in the appeal, it appears that Doxey
i Layton secretly assigned their mortgage to Beneficial Life

Iinmrance Company on November
Isame date of the closing, but said

2nd, 1964, almost the

nothing to respon<lant
about the assignment, which indeed was unnecessary.

I

Doxey Layton continued to service the mortgage, so
that payments which fell due thereunder were made to

IDoxey

Layton Company, instead of the mortgagee's
assignee, Beneficial Life Insurance Company, in spite of
the assignment.

Doxey Layton omitted one small detail, however.
They forgot to send the payments respondant made to
/ Doxey Layton Co. to Beneficial Life Insurance Company
j l!'ith the consequence that although the mortgage was curl rent in all respects, it showed delinquent on the books
I of Beneficial Life Insurance Co.

I

Beneficial Life Insurance Company, through its newly acquired attorney, was apparently not concerned
about checking out basic facts before filing suits. He
simply filed a complaint for foreclosure on the representations of Beneficial Life Insurance Company and without
any prior notice to respondant as to his intentions. (See
the file in case 160928 of the record on appeal in this
case.)
Upon receiving the summons and complaint, respondant went directly to Max Jenson, head of the mortgage
loan department at Beneficial Life Insurance Company,

5

and showed him undisputed evidence that the ""'
..
u10hga•e
w_as not in default in any way and asked him to
lus alleged arrear.age from his aO'ent
Doxey Layton c,om.
o
pany and to tend to the prompt dismissal of the fore·
closure complaint before more disastrous consequences
attached to Beneficial's rather indiscriminate practice of
filing fraudulent law suits.
Doxey Layton Comp.any was in the process of converting its accounting system and it was virtually impossible
at this time to find out anything from them about this
or any other loan. Apparently Beneficial wasn't .able to
get any satisfactory explanations from Doxey Layton,
either, .and suggested that respondant pursue Doxey Lay·
ton Co. for an accounting, which was attempted with the
same result, namely no result at all.
Since it appeared that Beneficial had made a rather
regrettable but somewhat unintentional mistake and since
some time would be required to pursue the Doxey Layton
matter, and since, at that time, several pressures were
mounting against respondant from other quarters, it
seemed to respondant that the best solution would he
to let Beneficial Life Insurance Company save face by
a simple stipulated forclosure in exchange for a stip·
ulated reinstatement privilege.
hut would pursue that company in an independent claim.
dant and his wife would give Beneficial Life Insurance
Company a stipulated foreclosure in exchange for a stip·
ulated reinstatement of the mortage at the end of the
redemption period and upon tender of the back pay·
ments. Respondant and his wife agreed that they would
not claim anything against Beneficial for the unremitted
and wrongfully withheld funds of Doxey Layton Co.,
6

bnt would pursue that company in a independent claim.
The stipulation was mostly oral, and left that way
because it was none of the business of the other parties,
11ho joined in the written portion of the stipulation, which
is to be found on page 50 of Case #160928 which is part
of the record on appeal in this case.
The court entered a decree of foreclosure, the sher.
riff sold the property, and at the end of the redemption
period, respondants brought to Beneficial Life Insurance Company the back payments with which to reinstate
the mortage, all in pursuance of the .agreement between
appellant and respondant.
V'ffien the back payments were brought to Beneficial,
however, a new face was encountered, that of one Eugene Watkins. His comment on the until then smoothly
running agreement was, '"We can't reinstate the mortage
now. Interest rates have gone up." (As indeed they had)
This breach of agreement coupled with the untoward
personal conduct of Eugene Watkins (described in paragraph 3 7 on page 10 of the record in suit # 17 407 6)
prornked the filing of a suit against appellants and its
agents to perform the agreement to reinstate and to recover damage for the attendant torts.

Upon receiving copies of the summons and complaint, Beneficial Life Insurance Company suddenly saw
the light, and decided to reconsider its decision to breach
the reinstatement agreement. They suddenly wanted to
perform the reinstatement agreement if only the attendant tort claims would be dismissed.
In response to the persuasion of mutual friends, hut

better judgement, respondant agreed
to d1sm1ss the tort causes of action and release hi" c1aim
·
for damages in exchange for performance of the earlier
agreement of Benenf icial Life Insur.ance Company to
reinstate the mortgage.
Respondant prepared the papers to reinstate the
mortgage by simply setting aside the decree and sale in
case No. 160209, but appellants seemed worried about
proceeding this way. There were some junior lien claim.
ants in case 160928 (Oak Hills, Tr:avis Wendelboe, and
the United States of America) and Beneficial was worried
that there might be some argument about the paramouncy
of their lien if the foreclosure decree were simply va·
cated by court order.
In order that the paramouncy of the appellant's lien
might he preserved, appellant suggested that the same
objective could be achieved if the sale were allowed to
stand and the property simply resold under contract.
The contract was objectionable to respondant and bis
wife because it would contain a forfeiture provision and
Beneficial Life Insurance had already demonstrated that
they weren't to be trusted, despite their ecclesiastical
ownership. Appellants suggested that the forfeiture
provisions could be removed by striking, but that they
should not be struck until the agreed balloon payment
had been made. Respondant expressed concern that the
anticipated monies with which to make the balloon pay·
ment miO'ht
not be received exactly as anticipated,• and
0
that in light of this exigency, a provision for last·mmute
rescue must be incorporated in case the rescue developed
into a foot-r:ace.
After due discussion, it was agreed that wording which
3

would allow the def easance of the foref eiture provlSlon,
and down to the time of an adverse trial or appellate
decision, and down to the very moment that respondant
was factually dispossessed, would be aceptable. Appellant
rnggested and respondant agreed that that would be
accomplished by the usage of the phrase "at any time."
After due deliberation, wording of the addendum was
finally agreed upon. It reads:

"Addendum:

Remedies provided under
paragraph 16 (a) of this contract shall not
be available to seller at any time after the
attached Judgement Note has been paid.
All other remedies shall be available at
any time.
The other remedies are set forth in paragraphs 16 ( c),
and would allow the appellant, at its option, at any time,
to either sue for delinquent installments or to forclose
the contract as a mortgage.
Simultaneously with the performance of the earlier
reinstatement agreement, which was accomplished when
the appellants signed the contract, respondant and his
wife released the appellant and its agents from any
claims for damages by reason of their torts and dismissed
the causes of action in the law suit which had been
filed to collect damages for the torts. Since the mort·
gage had been reinstated and the agreement fully performed, those causes of action seeking to compel that
performance were also dismissed.

Although appelants seem to delight in choosing words
like "bankrupt" to unnecessarily belittle and discredit
respondant for no relevant purpose, they do correctly

9

point out that respondant filed a petition under Chapter
XII of the Chandler Act with the Federal District Court
on September 14, 1967. Appellant intimates and implies
that the petition was calculated to effect or alter the
rights of the respondant under the reinstatement agreement
just performed. The very opposite is true. In all prob.
ability appellant's agents never stopped long enough in
the last 2 1/2 wears to even read the arrangement. If
they had, they would have discovered that the plan would
have left the subject relationship between appellant and
respondant unaffected. They seem to close their minds
and ears to the repeated reminder that it was fiied soley
and exclush-elly to counteract the illegal conduct of
Messrs Tuft, Marshall and Smith in a wholly unrelated
law suit.
The plan and .arrangement provided for the full and
complete performance of the respondanf s obligation to
Beneficial Life Insurance Company in the following
words (Paragraph 7 of the arrangement).
"That the $3,100.00 being held in escrow by Stan·
ley Tile Company by applied to meet the balloon
installment due to Beneficial Life Insurance Com·
pany on the property owned by the debtor.. · ·
Debtor proposes keeping current all payments due
on said contract out of current income and without
burdening the corpus of the estate for these pay·
ments."
Appe1lants, in their hysterical preoccupation to cate·
gorically oppose anything respondant proposes, and to
adjudge ipso facto, .anything respondant suggests as some·
thing meriting their opposition, have never stopped long
enough to realize that the approval of the plan would
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ha,·e provided insurance for the complete performance
of respondant's obligation on the reinstated mortgage.
Instead of supporting the plan. which would have guar·
anteed their payments, they joined with the respondant's
detractors and expended their energies for the next 18
months keeping respondant in litigation, and so preoccupied with law suits, writs, appeals, briefs, pleadings
and attendant difficulties that it was virtually impossible
to do anything except live in courts, and especially impossible to earn an income.
Even though one phase of that Chapter XH proceeding has been resolved adversely, thanks to the mindless
' opposition of the detractors, other phases are currently
being pursued on appeal in the United States Courts of
Appeal.
Appellants m their statement of the facts make a
great production of the action of Bruce Jenkins who gave
approval to pursue their relief in the State Courts. The
date originally set for hearing on the appellant's petition
was continued to a date convenient to appellants. On the
date of the continued hearing, appellants did not show
up, stating that the hearing had been held, in respondant's
absence, a day earlier, without any notice. Appellants
also forgot to tell this court that the order of Bruce
Jenkins is on appeal now.
During December 1967, respondant sold his equity in
the subject property, subject to the Beneficial lien, to one
' C. Dwayne Harrison, who, about January 1, 1968,
assumed possession of he property. As would be expected,
he had the gas, lights, and water changed to his name
as soon as he moved in. The affidavits supporting and
opposing summary judgment, as well as the deposition
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of both respondant and Mr · Harrison
attest tius· fact
·
abundantly, and the appellant has never undcrta1,aen or
attempted to controvert this fact.
Appellants were advised of the transfer of title orallv
during meetings held in 1968. Appellants were also well
advised that under 428 of the Chandler Act, (15 USC
828), all proceedings were automatically stayed as to
respondant. Appellants also knew that an .appeal was
pending before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
also had the effect of vitiating anything appellants might
do with respect to respondant.
At the time all of this was gomg on, Beneficial Life
Insurance Company was a corporation, organized and ex·
isting under the laws of the State of Utah. Its capital stock
was owned 100 per cent by the Corporation of the First
Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter.rlay
Saints. (See page 104 of the principal record, answer
# 7.) It had a hoard of directors which re.ads like a page
out of Who's who and discloses the following constitu·
ency: Presidents David 0. McKay, Hugh ll. Brown, N.
Eldon Tanner, and Joseph Fielding Smith, also Conway
A. Ashton, Ezra Taft Benson, Victor L. Brown, J. Alma
Burrows, Marion D. Hanks, Gordon B. Hinckley, G.
Marion Hinckley, Howard W. Hunter, Spencer W. Kim·
ball, Harold B. Lee, Thomas S. Monson, LeGrande Rich·
ards, .Marion G. Romney, Roy W. Simmons, Robert L.
Simpson,Virgil H. Smih, Henry D. TayJor, .Eugene P.
Watkins, Ernest L. Wilkinson, and Rulon W. White. (See
page 102 and 103 of the principal record.)
Besides being obviously prominent in the community,
the list of directors discloses the names of at least five
nationally prominent and hi.ghly respected attorneys.
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The board of directors of Beneficial Life Insurance Com-

pany, like any corporate board of directors, ran the company.

But became men of this standing and repute would
obYiously not tolerate the horse-play being conducted in
the name of Beneficial Life Insurance Company by some
of its officers and attorneys, and because men of this backgound would not knowingly be party to this bizarre attempt on the !lart of Beneficial Life Insurance Company
to reap a $30,000.00 windfall through legal chicanery,
at a 30,000.00 expense to respondant, and since such unconscionable conduct would obviously .reflect adversely
on the church which not only owns Beneficial Life Insurance Company but which this same board of directors,
in another capacity, governs, knowledge of these proceedings was carefully withheld from them, except Eugene
Wakins, Conway A. Ashton and Virgil Smith, who participately directly in the management and affairs of the
company.
The minutes of the directors' meeting discloses that no
action of any kind was taken by the board in this matter,
neither was it discussed. Neither were any resolutions,
one way or the other passed. The hoard simply did not
know and does not know what is going on in this case.
This whole action is the result of the contrivance of a
small group of individuals who understandably want to
remain nameless.
The by-laws of the appellant contain under Article
IV, Officers, Section 2, the standard boiler-plate provisions, which delegate to the Chairman of the Board, or
in his absence and the absence of all Vice Chairmen, to
the president of the corporation, the right to tend to the
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.affairs
the corporation, like hiring and fir.
mg clerks, and buymg rubber bands and paper clips and
paying the phone ,hill. Indeed, this delegation might be
sub-delegated, but the responsibility to make important
decisions rests with the chairman of the board. The Art.
icle provides:
"'In the absence of the Chairman of the Board and
of all vice chairmen, the president, if present,
shall preside at all meetings of the stockholders
and directors and shall have the general super·
vision of the affairs of the corporation."
How this can be stretched into a delegation to make
important decisions involving the property of other people
defies explanation, but had it been the then Chairman
of the board who was making the decisions, one coulJ
have been comfortable in the thought that the decision
would have been a just and fair one. As it is, the action
taken by the appellant was carefully withheld not only
from the board of directors, but from the chairman of the
board, whose first right it would be to know. President
David 0. McKay, to whom these duties were perhaps
delegated, was never absent and not only did not .author·
ize the action taken by appellants, but in fact had no
knowledge of it.
Now nothwithstanding the knowledge of the con·
veyanr.-e of the property to C. Dwayne Harrison, and
the knowledge of the appellant of the
pendency of the appeal to the Tenth Circuit, and not·
withstandi11g the absence of any authorization to act from
the Board of Directors, or its chairman (if he, arguendo.
had under his general supervisory powers the right to
make such major decisions without a
from the
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boarfl ) , J. Thomas Greene, served the confusino-0 and
contradictory notice set forth on pages 10 and 11 of the
appellant's brief on February 19th, 1968 (but not on the
other dates stated in appellant's brief.)
Mr. Greene makes some mention (on page 12 and 13
of appellant's brief) about a letter. While respondant
does not daim that this is the first time it has come to
his attention, since it was mentioned (for the first time)
late in the litigation, when it was attached to .an affidavit
which was in turn attached to a memorandum of authorities which Mr. Greene submitted to Judge Croft on June
2nd, 1969, it is extremely doubtful if it was ever sent,
and if it was, it is extremely doubtful if it was ever
received either by respondent or Mr. Harrison, although
it may have been. For purposes of a review of Judge
Croft's action it is .at least a highly suspect item and is
not one of those uncontroverted facts which might form
the basis of a summary judgment.
It is true that on October 21, 1968, (as alleged in Mr.
Greene's brief, but not on October 3rd, 1968, as inti·
mated in his brief) respondant, (not Mr. Harrison,
who should have been served) was served with the notice
to vacate the premises, as set forth on page 14 and 15
of the appellant's brief. It is likewise true that none
of the directors, except Virgil Smith, Conway Ashton, and
Eugene Watkins knew anything about this action, either.
Neither did the chairman of the board.
Two days after the notice to quit aforesaid was re·
ceived, C. Dwayne Harrison (and not respondant) tendered first to Max E. Jenson, .at Beneficial, and then on
Mr. Jenson's instructions, tendered to J. Thomas Greene,
two checks one in the amount of $3,192.00 and one in the

'
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amount of $.3,860.00 ( See page 70 of the principal record
for Xerox pictures thereof). One check paid the co ·
.
.
.
gnont
note. m full, mcludmg interest and the other check paid
all mstalhnents to <late, reducing the principal balance
on the mortgage to about $28,000.00.
Because of the appellant's illegal refusal to accept the
same, Mr. Harrison, by written document kept the tender
continuous.
In May 1969, in a separate unrelated transaction,
respondant reacquired from Mr. Harri30n the property
in question; Mr. Harrison moved out of the home,
respondant took possession, and at the time of Judge
Croft's judgment re'lpondant was the owner .and con·
tinues to be the owner of the property at this time.
Judge Croft, upon extensive and diligent considera·
tion of appellant's arguments rendered his decision on
June 23rd, 1969. Parting with his custom and practice,
he tolerated two additional hearings, one in July and one
in September 1969 in which he patiently permitted
appellants to re-argue and re-hash their positions and
legal theories. In each instance he patiently reconsidered
his former action, making all allowances he could for the
new arguments presented, could not possibly see how the
law would allow any result except a summary judgment
for respondant. Appellant's case could not possibly stand
under the multiple ohvious defects therein.
ARGUMENT
Judge Croft's scholarly opinion bases the
on
the notices, the actions of the appellant after the notices,
and the tender, and in doing this, he perceptively analyzes
the cases, applies the facts, and reaches a completely cor·
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iect decision. However, even if he were wrong on these

points, there are additional reasons he doesn't even touch
upon which would justify the same result. His theories,
Lased upon the notices, the conduct and the tender, which
nre nn<ler attack by appellants will be defended by this
response, but going beyond that, the theories which Judge
Croft disregarded in reaching his decision, which would
produce the same result, will also be brought to the atten. tion of this court as additional reasons for up holding
' the decision of Judge Croft.
Appellants cite seven cases as authority for their position, but they confuse the issue by not citing them in
chronological order. The oldest case is Forrester vs.
Cook, 77 U 13 7, 292 P 206 ( 1930). The most recent case
they cite is Van Zyverden vs. Farrer, 15 U 2d 367, 393
P2d 468 (1964). By considering them in chronological
. orrler, one can observe the growth of the law in Utah in
forfeiture actions.
1

Moreover, we are dealing here with the "rule of each
case." Each Supreme Court opinion is the "law of the
case" which it decides, and rests upon the facts .and issues
which it decides. There are admittedly some similarities
in the cases cited, but the similarities are few when compared with the differences, and the general propositions
stated are only somewhat helpful. There are no cases in
point, and every case decided can he easily distinguished
on the facts.
Respondant has undertaken to do a "canned brief'
on each case so that the propositions for which the case
stands can be understood in light of the context in which
the propositions are announced and in light of the facts
of the particular case in which the opinion was rendered.
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The ''canned briefs" are set forth in the appendix to thr
respondant's brief.

POINT I.
FORRESTER VS COOK IS DISTINGUISHABLE ON
THE FACTS AND IS NOT CONTROLLING.
The Forrester vs. Cook case (77 U 137, 292, P 206,
1930) is really not very helpful. It took a later decision to
articulate and differentiate the difference between self.
executing and non-self executing provisions in a forfeiture
clause in a contract. (Leona vs. Zunig.a, infra). But that
is wholly unimportant. The provision in the Forrester
conract was self-executing. It stated:
"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms
hereof by the buyer or upon failure to make any
payment when the same shall become due, or
within sixty days thereafter, the seller shall be
released from all obligations in law and equity....
(etc.) . . . the buyer at once becoming a tenant
at will of the seller."
The notice which the seller served upon the buyer
said the following
"You and each of you will further take notice
that by reason of your failure to make the pay·
ments hereinbefore referred to, you and each of
you under the tenns of said agreement have he·
come and now .are and are hereby declared to he
the tenants at will of Diana Forrester; and as such
1
•
d t o vacate
you and each of you are liereny
reqmre
'
·
t}1ereof
the property ... and surrender possess10n
·

13

to said Diana Forrester within five days from the
<late of the service of this notice upon you."
The buyers first refused to comply, then later, but
prior to trial, disclaimed any interest in the property and
tendered possession to the seller.
The law suit was not over possession, but over the
question of damages and attorney fees. The opinion, in
fact, states so expressly: (Page 208)
"The cause was thereupon tried upon the issues of
damages and an attorney's fee only."
The trial court allowed trebled damaged and denied
an attorney's fee. Both parties appealed. The only issues
which were before the Supreme Court for decision were
(1) Whether the claim for the hold-over was "rent" or
"damages," damages being subject to being trebled and
rent not being subject to being trebled, and (2) whether
an attorney's fee would lie.
The Supreme Court made the statement which
Appellants cite on p.age 25 of the brief in order to establish at which point the buyers became tenants at will of
the sellers.
POINT II.
THE CASE OF LEONA VS. ZUNIGA DOES NOT
STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION FOR WHICH
APPELLANT CITES IT.

In reading the Leona vs. Zuniga case ( 84 U 417, 34
P2d 699, 1934) and re-reading the case, and reading and
re.reading what appellant claims for it, it becomes increas-
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uncle.ar how this case coald in any way relate to the
issues at bar in the instant case.
The Leona vs. Zuniga case was indeed a very im.
portant milestone in the growth of the law, but it doesn't
stand for anything helpful in this case. The Leona vs.
Zuniga case holds that the seller's complaint for possession
didn't state a cause of action because it did not allege that
seller had given buyer notice of seller's election.
Now how that can possibly bear on anything relevant
in this case is something appellant should explain better.
There was no way the Supreme Court could decide (in
the Leona vs. Zuniga case) the sufficiency of a notice
that was never served.
The dictum is interesting, however. It distinguishes
between self-executing and non-seif-executing provisions
in .a contract, and gives a good example of each kind. It
observed that the Leona-Zuniga contract was unlike the
Bergman vs.
contract ( 68 U 178, 249 P 4 70), which
was self-executing, and like the Howorth vs. Mills (62
U 574, 221 P 165) contract, which was not self-executing,
and which required notice from seller to buyer that the
seller had made the election availabe to him in order to
put the buyer in unlawful detainer status.
The articulation of the rationale in the Leona vs.
Zuniga case is very helpful. The court clarified the rea·
son for the holding. It said that in non-self-executing
type forfeiture contracts, the seller merely gains the right
to make elections upon the buyer's default. He may
elect to stand up on his right to declare .a forfeiture, or
may elect to waive the forfeiture and to enforce the con·
tract according to its terms. The object of the language
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is to give the ven<ler his election. If he wants to arnil
himself of his right to avoid the contract, he must make an
unequivocal election evidencing that intention. A contrary rule would place the buyer in a dilemma. If the
buyer vacates the premises, he may be confronted with
an acticn to enforce the contract. If he fails to vacate,
he may be met with a suit for possession.

In one respect, the Leona vs. Zuniga case is similar to
the case at b.ar. Respondant certainly agrees that the case
at bar !s not self-executing. But the similarity ends there.
Asi<le from the fact that the Leona-Zuniga contract did
not have an addendum, like the case at bar, which took
away the forfeiture remedies entirely, the forfeiture
clause itself is vastly different.
By juxtaposing the two_ clauses, the differences can be
readily ascertained. The Leona-Zuniga contract provided
as follows:

'"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms
hereof, by buyer, or upon failure to make any
payment when the same shall become due, or
within 60 days thereafter, the seller, at his option,
shall at his option be released ... (etc).
The clause at the case at bar provides as follows:
"Upon the failure of the buyer to make any payment or payments when the same shall become
due, or within 30 days thereafter, the seller, at
his option shall have the following alternative
remedies, (a) Seller shall have the right, upon
faiure of the buyer to remedy the default within
five days after written notice, to be released. . . .
(etc).

In the Leona-Zuniga contract, the seller had the auto-
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matic option, after 60 days of continuous default in mak.
ing payments, to be released. If that seller, (Leona) had
only acted upon that option, had only given the notice of
his election that option entitled him to give, and had only
alleged in his complaint that he had, by written notice
exercised the option he was entiled to exercise, the Su:
preme Court probably would not have mandated the dis.
trict court to sustain the buyer's demurrer to the seller's
complaint.
In the instant Beneficial Life Insurance case, as dis·
tinguished from the Leona-Zuniga case, the appellant has
no rights at all until there is a 30 day default. But only
after 30 days, when it ha3 some choices to make, can it
make some choices. It can proceed with remedy (b) (file
suit to recover the delinquent payments), or with remedy
( c) (foreclose the contract like a mortgage) without any
further notice at all. Remedies 16(h) and l6(c) are
available without giving any notices first.
However, if it chooses remedy (a), it must first 0£ all
give notice that the contract is in default and demand that
the default be remedied within five days after notice.
It must then patientlly await the expiration of five days.
If the buyer does not remedy the default in the five days,
seller has some new choices. It can do several things at
that point:

I. Do nothing at all.

2. Treat the contract as being in full force and effect,
and proceed to enforce it.

3. Exercise the remedies available in paragraph
16(b ).
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4. Exercise the remedies available m

16(c).

paragraph

5. Exercise its remedy available in paragraph 16 (a)
to be released from his obligations in law and equity to
conYey the property, forfeit the payments made as liquidated damages (under certain very strict conditions, not
present here), and re-enter and take possession of the
property (if it can do so without breaching the peace),
which, if it succeeds in doing, would make the respondant a tenant at will of the appellant.
There is only one hitch. If respondant elects not to
do nothing at all, and not to treat the contract as being in
full force and effect, and not to exrcise he remedies prodded in 16(b) and 16(c), it must give an additional
notice that it has elected to exercise the rights which are
conditionally given to it in paragraph 16 (a).
But the appellant doesn't have any rights to exercise
until after the contract is 30 days in default, AND after
the appellant has given notice to remedy the default
within 5 days, AND after five days have elapsed that the
respondent has not remedied the default.
Now if all of that happens, the appellant can start
making its choices. The appellant might choose to do
any number of things, but if it chooses to go on with
remery 16 (a), it must notify respondant that it is going
to do that and not something else. And if it does notify
respondant that it is going to go on with remedy 16(a),
and respondant doesn't allow the appellant to re-enter
the premises, .as the contract provides, then the appellant
would have succeeded in putting the respondant in statu23

tory unlawful detainer status, and could file its suit for
possession.
Now the unlawful detainer statutes require that one
m unlawful detainer status is entitled to still additional
in writing, requiring in the alternative the per.
:tormance of (the breached) conditions or covenants
or the surrender of the property. It also provides that'
within three days after the service of the notice, the
tenant (or other interested parties) may perform (the
breached) conditions or covenants .and hereby save the
(contract) from forfeiture. (See 68.36-3 ( 5).
Now no decision in Utah has gone as far as to describe
each of the notices required, mainly because it hasn't
needed to in order to decide the cases. Mr. George Mc·
Millan, who argued the case for the Van Zyverdens in
their case against Seagull Investment Co. ( 15 U 2d 367,
393 P 2d 468) urged this court to consider the additional
notices required by the unlawful detainer statute itself,
but since this court found the Van Zyverden notices in·
sufficient to place the Van Zyverdens in unlawful detain·
er status, it was unnecessary to decide the question Mr.
McMillan urged in his brief, namely, what notices a per·
son in unlawful detainer status is entiled to, and what
he might do to save his contract, once he is in that status.
\Vhen we get to thhe Van Zyverden case in this brief,
we will examine the argument in greater detail.
But to end the consideration of the Leona vs. Zuniga
case with an unanswered question, we might ask ourselves
why appellant would cite a case which holds that at least
some notice must be given in order to state a cause of
action. No one quarrels with that proposition, but how
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is appellant helped by it? We need to examine cases
where notices were served, not where they weren't served,
and look into the facts and rationale to find out how and
when they might he served and what they have to say
in order to he legally sufficient.

POINT III.
THE CHRISTY VS. GUILD IS IN POINT IN
PART

BUT IS

DISTINGUISHABLE ON

THE

FACTS FROM THE INSTANT CASE.
Of .all of the cases appellant cites, Christy vs. Guild
(101 U 313, 121 P 2d 401, 1942) is its strongest case, hut
it can easily he distinguished from the case at bar. The
case is set forth in "canned brief" form in the appendix,
hut briefly, the transaction involved a $3,200.00 home on
which the buyer made no down payment, hut agreed to
pay the entire purchase price in deferred installments
of $20.00 for six months, then $25.00 for six months, then
S30.00 for six months for the duration of the contract.
The Supreme Court did not favor us with the language
of the contract, as it usually does in forfeiture cases, but
merely paraphrased it. On the very last page of the
opinion, under the second paragraph of headnote ( 5),
we read the following:

"In the present action, respondants in their com·
plaint set out the contract, which provided that
upon default of the vendees, the vendors might
elect to terminate the contract and upon such
termination might retain as liquidated damages
the payments theretofore made by the vendees,
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the latter thereupon becoming tenants at the \iill
of the former .
. Since this case is one of the most important case;
which. appellants cite, it was thought wise to get the
before us, so that it can be compared
with the mstant case. The files and records of the Salt
Lake County Clerk's office contain the contract, which
is reproduced, in part in the appendix. The exact wordina
0
of the salient provisions of the contract reads as follows:
'"On failure of the parties of the second part, ... to
make any of the payments when due or for fifteen
days after they become due, ... or on faailure to
comply with the provisions of this agreement in
any other respect, all payments made under this
contract may, at the option of the parties of the
first part, become forfeited ... as liquidated dam·
ages, ... "
Juxtaposing that language with the language of the
Beneficial Life conract we can draw the comparisons anJ
disinctions. The language in this (The Beneficial) con·
tract, already set forth earlier in this brief, provides that
only after 30 days default, and only after the failure of
the respondant to remedy the default after 5 days written
notice, does the appellant have the elections the seller
in the
contract automatically had upon 60
days default. There is quite a difference. Both the
instant contract and the Chrisy-Guild contract require the
seller to make an affirmative, overt election and to give
the buyer notice that the election was made. But there
the similarity ends. In the Christy-Guild contract, the
seller had the right to make an election after 60 days of
unremedied continuous default in making installments.
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In the instant (Beneficial) contract, the seller had the
right to serve a demand after 30 days of unremedied continuous default. To say there is an obvious difference is
an unpardonable understatement.
The Christy vs. Guild case is a baffling case, however.
The buyers tendered partial performance of the defaults
prior to suit. They were required, by the notice of election, to bring current $130.00 in arrearages, pay $297.20
in back taxes and insurance, and made improvements on
the property they had agreed to make. The buyers
tendered the .arrearages, but did not tender the back taxes
and insurance and did not make the improvements.
The buyers apparently felt secure in the tender of
the partial performance required by the notice. They
at least felt secure enough to argue that it was a question
for the jury as to whether there was a default, their theory
apparently being that the partial tender remedied the
default.
On appeal, the appellants (in the Christy vs. Guild
case) didn't even attack the sufficiency of the notice.
The appellants (in that case) simply argued that ( 1) the
default was a question for the jury and ( 2) that the trial
court should have considered the "equities" between the
parties and have adjudged the buyers entitled to some
reimbursement for the improvements made and the large
amount paid on the contract (approximately one-third
of the principal plus interest).
The second point seemed to bother the court some,
hut it found that in light of the fact that the buyers had
paid no down payment, only $20.00 for six months, then
$25.00 for six months, then $30.00 per month thereafter,

27

and that the improvemens made were reasonably worth
$2,000.00 and that the property had yielded a net income
of $75.00 per month, and that the buyers had been in
possession from 1935 to 194.2, that there were no equities
in favor of the buyers to be considered.
It is curious to ponder the holding of that case in
light of the issues presented by instant case.
The first issue in the Christy vs. Guild case was
whether undisputed evidence on a question of fact should
be submitted to a jury for determination.
The Supreme Court held it need not be.
The second issue was whether the forfeiture on the
facts of this case constituted a forefeiture.
The Supreme Court held that on the facts oE the
Christy vs. Guild case, the forfeiture was not a penalty.
Beneficial Life Insurance Co. has failed to tell us in
their brief how the Christy vs. Guild issues relate to the
isssues between Beneficiial Life Insurance Co. and
respondant.
POINT IV.
THE PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT VS. STEWARll'
CASE IS IN POINT IN PART BUT IS DISTIN·
GUISHABLE ON THE FACTS FROM THE IN·
STANT CASE.
The Pacific Development vs. Stewart case (113 U
403, 195 P 2d 748, 1948) case is very much like the
Christy vs. Guild case, but it can be distinguished from

1

Christy vs. Guild on the facts of the case and on the
;,.mes decided on appeal.
On the facts, the Stewart property involved a
S.5.900.00 purchase with $100.00 down. The balance
of the purchase price was pay.able in deferred monthly
installments of $55.00. The rental value of the property
was $.50.00. The Christy vs. Guild case involved a
$3,200.00 property with no down payment, and the entire
halance payable in deferred paymens beginning at $20.00
and ending at $30.00 per month. The rental value of the
Christy property w.as $75.00 per month.

In the Christy vs. Guild case, the buyer tendered
partial per/ ormance on the demanded performance prior
to the time suit was filed. In the Pacific Development vs.
Stewart case, the buyer tendered no per/ormance at all,
even up to and including the time in trial. The court
also held that Stewarts would not have been unable to
perform even if giHn a longer time in wi1ich to do so.
The issue before the Court in the Christy case was
whether the evidence presented a question for the jury
and whether the forfeiture was a penalty.
The issue before the Court in the Pacific case was
whether 23 days was a reasonable period of time in which
to cure the default. The trial court found 23 days unreasonable. The Supreme Court found 23 days reasonable.
As far as the contract prov1s10ns are concerned, the
Stewart and Christy cases are alike, but in their alikeness,
are unlike the contract provisions in the Beneficial
contract.

. This difference has already been pointed out (in
pomt 3 supra). In both the Christy and Pacific cases
the buyer was automatically given the right to make ai;
election after 60 days of continuous default.
In ihe Beneficial contract, the appellant has the right
to make an election to be released ONLY IF the contract
is 30 days or more in default, AND ONLY IF he then
gives 5 days notice to remedy the default, AND ONLY
IF, after 5 days notice, he buyer has failed to remedy the
default. Now assuming arguendo, all of this has hap·
pened, it may make an election. Now IF it makes that
election, and IF it gives notice to the respondant of that
election, he may (under certain conditions not here pres·
ent) place the respondant in unlawful detainer status.
AND IF it gives the statutory notices required by the un·
lawfu detainer statutes AND IF the respondant does not
comply, it may file a suit for dispossession.
There are other distinctions, which question the
service of the notices, the equities, the penalty forfeiture,
the need for appellant not to obstruct respondant's per·
formance, and which question the sufficiency of the
notices, but that will be saved for later argument in order
to avoid too much redundancy.
POINT V.
FUHRIMAN VS. BISSEGGER IS NOT IN POINT.
The court held in the Fuhriman vs. Bissegger case
(13 U 2d 379, 375 P 2d 27) as in the Leona vs. Zuniga
case that since the contract had no self-executing pro·
'
vision, a notice was necessary, and since the seller gave
the buyer no notices, there could be no forfeiture and
30

1

Lhe counterclaim of buyer, to compel specific performaace should be upheld.

Among numerous obvious differences, which are
amply set forth in the discussion of the prior cases, and
, which do not need repeating here, it might be noted that
. the contract called for $10.00 per month and that the
I buyer was in possession of the property from .about 1946
to 1952.
1

i

i
It seems almost a shame to dignify this citation with
: further responses and it leaves us wondering why
appellant chose to cite the case at all.
1

POINT VI.
JACOBSEN VS. SWAN IS NOT IN POINT.
Appellants have so completely mis-quoted Jacobsen
i rs. Swan (3 Utah 2<l 59, 278 P 2d 294, 1954) case that
there is cause for "ome alarm, if it be found that it was
intentional. The citation on page 26 of the appelllant's
brief doesn't relate to the purchase contract at .all. Appellants would (mis) (?)lead us into believing that the
Supreme Court, in discussing the question of tender, was
talking about tender of performance under a vendorrcntlee contract.
This is a rank case of misquoting an opinion by lifting the quotation out of context and giving it a meaning
not intended by the court.
The Jacobsen vs. Swan case does not involve the
litigation over a sale purchase contract, but over a lease
agreement. It is true there was initially a contract between Jacobsen and Swan, but it was twice superseded.
The contract which was executed in June, 1947, was, be-

cause of aggr:avated defaults thereunder, cancelled by
mutual consent and replaced with a lease agreement.
That lease agreement because of aggravated defauts there.
under, was cancelled by mutual consent and replaced
with .a new lease agreement on June 27, 1950. On March
5, 1952, lessor served lessee with an unconditional notice
to quit. On August 12, 1952, a similar unconditional
notice to quit was served. When the lessees failed to quit,
an unlawful detainer action was filed.
As an interesting aside, the trial court gave the buyer
judgment against seller for $3,190.00, being the excess of
the monies paid to seller over the rental v.alue of the
property. The Supreme Court gave the buyer even more,
and required the seller to account, in addition to the sums
awarded by the trial court, for excess payments under
the first lease and excess payments under the second
lease.
POINT VII.
THE VAN ZYVERDEN VS. SEAGULL CASE IS
VERY MUCH IN POINT AS FAR AS SOME ISSUES
ARE CONCERNED, BUT CAN BE DISTIN·
GUISHED ON OTHER ISSUES, AND IN PART, ON
THE FACTS.
The Van Zyverden vs. Seagull case ( 15 U 2d 364, 393
P 2d 468, 1964) is the most helpful of all cases cited, and
being the most recent of the seven cases cited by appell.ant,
is the most controlling. But in addition to these obvious
reasons to pay greater heed to its holding, it is most closely
in point on the facts relating to the notice.

In that case, the court held that the notice to the Van
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Zpenlcns of February 10, 1962 was not effective to perfrd Scagull's right to maintain an unlawful detainer
action.
Now that Court does not say in its opin.ion what notice

it was
was served on February 10, 1962, hut implies
that the notice of February 10, 1962 was served because
' of some uncrtainty in the sufficiency of the notice served
Jannary 3, 1962. Neither the briefs of Mr. McMillan who
argued the case for the Van Zyverdens, nor the brief of
Earker, wl10 argued the case for Se.agull shed any
light on which notices were served on which dates. Only
through an examination of the records of Wasatch County
Clerk's office could this he ascertained.
1

Copies of the relevant documents have been xeroxed
and are supplied in the appendix to this brief.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract is dated Septem·
, lwr 25, 1960. Ralph W. Farrer and his wife appear as
sellers and Leo Van Zyverden and his wife appear as
buyers. The sellers assigned their interest in the contract
to Seagull.
The contract provided for a purchase price of $60,
000.00, refleckd a down payment of $5,000.00, and a
halancc of $55,000.00 to be paid in deferred annual
installments of $2,750.UO beginning November 1, 1961.
The forfeiture clause in the contract in question was
worded identically with the Beneficial Life contract,
(except that the Van Zyverden contract did not have
the acl<lenda).
It like the Beneficial Life contract, provided that
upon ' the failure of the buyer to make payments when
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due, or within 30 days thereafter, the seller at his opt'
'
!On
shall have the following alternative remedies:
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the
buyer to remedy the default within five days
after written notice, to be released from all ob]i.
gations in law and equity to convey said property
... and to forfeit all payments as liquidated dam.
ages . . . the buyer becoming at once a tenant at
will. . . .
On December 1, 1961, Seagull declare<l the contract
in default, and by written notice served on that date, gave
the Van Zyverdens until noon on December 7, ] 961 to
remedy the default.
On January 3, 1962, Seagull served another somewhat
redundant notice in expanded form alleging other defaults, and demanding in the last paragraph of that notice,
that the buyers remedy the defaults within 5 days, in this
language:
You are further notified that in the event that
you fail to remedy your defaults in performance
of the contract annexed hereto as exhibit "A", and
to perform the covenants and conditions which you
are obligated to perform under the terms of said
contract within five days . . . (etc.).
On January 16, 1962, Seagull filed an action against
the Van Zyverdens, in unlawful detainer.
On February 10, 1962, R. E. Weaver, constable, served
a "Notice to Vacate Premises," which required the Van
Zyverdens to vacate the premises within 5 days.
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On February 13, 1962, he Seagulls filed a countcrcl:iim in the action which the Van Zyverdens had filed
Se.agull on December 1, 1961. The cases were
consolidated for trial.
The trial court held that the notice of February 10,
1962 was not effective to perfect Seagull's right to maintain unlawful detainer in that action.

If one follows the dates of the events closely, one
might infer that the reason for the court's action was
that the actions were filed prematurely. It does indeed
appear that Seagull got ahead of itself, but that is not
the hasi.s of the ruling.

1

1

On January 16, 1962, when Seagull file<l its action,
it had only served the one notice "'to remedy the default
wihin 5 days of the notice," although it apparently served
a similar notice on December 1, 1961. While it is undisputed that Seagull served a five day notice twice, (even
though the second notice was worded somewhat differently) it was deemed to be two services of the same five day
notice, because he notices demanded the identical performance on the part of the buyer.
On February 13, 1962, when Seagull filed its counterclaim, it had only allowed three days to ealpse since its
"notice to quit" was served (it was served on February

10, 1962).
The timing was obviously wrong .and was by itself
sufficient to justify a dismissal of Seagull's unlawful
detainer action, hut we should not allow ourselves to be
distracted from the holding and rationale of the case, as
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reported, by these inci<lenal facts, which would ha-,e
justified the same result on a different legal theory.
The Van Zyverden case is not decided on the timin•
of the notices. It is based upon the failure of the selle;
to make the elections he was entitled to make, when he
was entitled to ma/re them, and to give notice of those
elections to the buyer.
The Supreme Court, in referring to paragraph 16(a)
cited just prior to the following quote, says:
"This provision requires the seller to make his elec.
tion, and the buyer is entitled to notice that he
has done so."
Now what election is the court talking about? One
could easily misunderstand that it refers to the option
contained in the stem of paragraph 16 and not the right
to elect that is contained in paragraph A, since the words
to be found in the stem "at his option" are italicized for
emphasis.
The election the court is talking about is not the
option referred to in the stem to choose between remedies
A, B, and C, but the election the seller has to make
AFTER he has given the five day notice required by para·
graph A, and AFTER five days have elapsed, .and AFTER
the five day failure of buyer to respond. This means that
after one election is made it must he followed by another
election at least five days later.
The opinion cannot have any other meaning. Para·
graph A set forth in the opinion is indented on both sides.
It is set off in quotes, as a sub-paragraph should he. Im·
mediately following the close of quotes, the opinion said
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"This provision requires seller to maJ;e his election."
\rlwt provision requires seller to make his election? The

proYision in paragraph A. While an antecedent option
was already exercised, in deciding between A, B, and C,
the opinion does not refer to this antecedent exercise of
options between A, B, and C, but the election which A
itself requires, AFTER the five day notice is served and

AFTER five days have elapsed, and AFTER the five day
failure of buyer to respond. The option referred to in
the stem is exercised BEFORE the five day notice, and
a priori, before any other notices are served.
The Van Zyverden case is extremely closely reasoned.
It is .amazing to observe the fidelity with which appellant
in its brief has reproduced the opinion, and has correctly
observed that the Van Zyverden opinion held that whether
a cause of action in unlawful detainer exists is to be
determined at the time the action is commencd and that
the notices were insufficient to impart notice of an election of the optional forf eiure remedy under par.agraph
16A.
On page 33 of the appellant's brief, however, is a
disturbing and erroneous conclusion in an attempt to
apply the legal principles pronounced in the opinions the
appellant cites, to the facts of this case.

33)

Mr. Greene says: (in the second paragraph on page
"Paragraph 16A is non-sef-executing provision similar to those in Christy vs. Guild, Pacific Development Company vs. Stewart and Van Zyverden vs.
Farrer."
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At the bottom of page 33, he continues:
within paragraph 16A is clearly ex.
plamed m Leona vs. Zuniga where the Court con.
strued a virtually identical provision, stating that
. ( etc ) ."
1t:
None of the cases, Christy vs. Guild, Pacific Develop.
ment vs. Stewart and Leona vs. Zuniga stand for the proposition he urges. It is indeed true that they deal with
non-self-executing contracts, and that regard they are like
the contract at bar, but in what these options and elec·
tions entitle the seller to do, and when he may exercise
them, they are unlike the case at bar and the Van
Zyverden case. (Van Zyverden and the case at bar are
alike.)

In the Christy, Pacific, and Leona cases, the seller

had the option automatically to be released, etc., etc., in
case of buyer's default. He only had to exercise it and
give notice to the buyer, in writing, that he had
it.
In the case at bar and in the Van Zyverden case, the
seller had the option of choosing between A, B, and C, in
case of buyer's default. Now if he chose B and C, he
could give notice of that election and proceed with the
remedies B and C provided. But if he chose A, he had
to bAgin by giving a 5-day notice to remedy the default,
and then wait five days, and then upon the buyer's five
day failure to respond, make another election, and to
give the buyer notice of this election. This, Seagull failed
to do, and this is what the Supreme Court talks about in
the Van Zyverden opinion. This Beneficial Insurance Co.
has .also failed to do, and aside from the multitudinous
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other reasons for dismisssing the complaint, it is fatally
dcf ective on this ground alone.

It is interesti"ng to follow the logic of Mr. George
McMillan on page 32 of his brief in the Van Zyverden
case. He claimed that even if Seagull had followed all
of these notices, i.t could not successfully maintain an
unlawful detainer action until it had served the buyer
wih the requisite stautory notices. The court never pursneJ thi'> argument. but it is interesting. If one turns to
the Unlawful Detainer Statutes, one observes that once
one gets into unlawful detainer status, certain statutory
notices, (in addition to the contractual notices) are required. In other words, it takes all of the contractual
notices to get a buyer into unlawful detainer status, and
then once in unlawful detainer status, it takes statutory
notice to get him out of possession. Neither this case nor
the Van Zyverden case need go that far, but it does pro·
vide an interesting glimpse into the future.
POINT VIII.
APPELLANT HAS NEVER OWNED THE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS LITlGA TION.
Beginning on the bottom of page 40, appellants make
the incredible claim that they were the owners of the
subject property at the time the complaint was filed. The
same deception which they attempted to foist upon the
trial court, they now try to foist upon the Supreme Court.
They base their whole claim to ownership on the
sheriff's return of sale and the record title. Respondant's
affidavit does not admit that the appellant is the fee title
39
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1
holder, hut does admit that appellant is the record title \
holder. Do we have to play children's games with words
and labels? Do we have to resort to such deception in
order to avoid the substance of things?

If words aren't supposed to convey concepts and
ide.as, why do we even use them? If we twist a word or
use it to convey the exact opposite meaning it is supposed
to have, what integrity are words and meanings supposed
to have?
Of course the Sheriff's return shows a change of
record title. We aren't concerned here with what the
sheriff's return shows. We are concerned with what it
doesn't show. It doesn't show that the foreclosure was
pursuant to a stipulation, and with the understanding that
the mortgagors would continue to own the property and be
entitled to a reinstatement upon the payment of the back
paymentE>. Is a sheriff's return supposed to show the
underlying agreement? Is our thinking so juvenile that
we have to stop and explain things like this?
Of course the record title shows in the appellant. How
could it be otherwise? The County Recorder doesn't stop
to as questions .about how documents came into existence.
Is she supposed to? What would happen to her if she
refused to record recordable documents? Her office is a
repository for documents, not a board of inquiry. She
records the documents placed before her for the benefit
of third parties who may know the actual facts. Are we
so bereft of reason and such robots that we have to waste
people's time in explaining such obvious facts?
What does it mean to be an "owner" of property?
Is this the same as being ''record title holder?" What does
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•·fee title" mean? Does the record title holder in this case
(appellant) enjoy the same status as the sellers in the
se,·eu cases cited in appellant's brief?
Harry Emerson Fos<lick has characterized our orreneration as one mindlessly pursuing slogans .and labels without
regard to the substance of the labels, designations and
terms which we throw around like so many magpies. Is
appellant trying to prove him correct?

POINT IX.
APPELLANT EVER SOLD TO AND RESPOND.
ANT NEVER BOUGHT FROM ANYTHING FROM
EACH OTHER.
On page 41 of the brief, appellant pursues the absurdity of its complaint a little further. It recites paragraph 3 of its complaint and then urges the Supreme
Court, of all things, to believe it.
Just what does it means to sell something? What does
it mean to buy somethjng? What happened to the buyer
and seller in each of the seven cases quoted by appellants
in their brief?
Did the seven buyers and the seven sellers in the cases,
quoted as authorities, contract at the market price for the
property which w:as bought and sold? Were any of the
buyers suing the seller to compel the "seller" to perform
it8 agreement to reinstate the mortgage which it had
wrongfully and illegally, but nonetheless in pursuance to
a stipulation, foreclosed in exchange for an agreement to
reinstate it upon the payment of the back payments?
Did the "sellers" in each of the seven cases cited by
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the appellant's "sell" the property for approximately 50
per cent of its value? Did any of the sellers arrive at an
asking price by taking the mortgage balance, ad<ling accrued interest and deducting the payments? (Note the
unusual sales price of $34,,613.59) Did any of the sellers
agree to .accept an interest rate on the deferred balance
1 per cent below prevailing interest rates on mortgages?
(Note the 5 1/2 per cent rate in the contract-the exact rate
in the mortgage.)
Were there any of the •'sellers" in each of the seven
who had never set foot inside of the house that was
being "sold"? Had any of the ''buyers" been in occupancy
.and ownershp of the home they were "purchasing" three
years before they bought it from the "seller"?
Are appellants trying to tell the court that they are
"sellers" like the seven sellers in the seven cases cited?
Are appellants trying to tell the court that the respon<lant
was a "buyer" like the seven buyers in the seven cases
cited?
Just what is it the appellants are trying to tell the
court? That they feel secure in the status a label might
confer upon them? That the substance of an item is of
no consequence? That law is concerned with labels and
slogans and not substance? Or just wherein do rational
men fail to undersand these appellants?
POINT X.
ALLOWANCE OF THE FOREFEITURE WOULD
RESULT IN A $30,000.00 WINDFALL TO APPEL·
LANT AND A $30,000.00 PENALTY TO RESPOND·

ANT.
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W11ile a<lvocacy has always been an art, it has reached
new heights of perfection in .appeBant's case. The
appellant has been able to achieve an impression 100 per
cent false without making one false statement.
Paragraph 4 oI the complaint and the argument on
the bottom of page 47 of appellant's brief would actually
lead the court to believe that a forefeiture of respondant's
equity would result in a $266.00 loss.
What happened to the $60,000.00 home that was on
the lot in 1965? What happened to the $28,000.00 mortgage that was left owing on the home after the payments
made in October 1968? What happened to the $32,000.00
equity?
The answer is very easy, according to the appellants.
$32,000.00 got lost in the paper work. After all, it's not
homes .and improved real estate that's involved here. It's
just papers, and documents, and things like that which
have no intrinsic value.

If the paper work shows a $226.00 forfeiture, that's
all that matters? What the paper work really reflects is
of no interest or consequence?
Are the appellants trying to tell us that the "buyers"
in the seven cases cited all forfeited a 55% equity to those
"sellers" who prevailed in their forfeiture actions?
Are the appellants really trying to tell us that they
have been damaged $32,000.00 if the contract was, arguen<lo breached? Are they trying to tell us that a $32,000.00
forfeiture is not a penalty? Is this a church-owned institution which is urging such views upon us?
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These questions were Yery ably answered by
Croft. Despite all attempts on the part of the appellants
to hide and cover up the obvious equities between the
parties, Judge Croft saw through the scheme and, in his
opinion first questioned why Beneficiial Life Insurance
Company, a church-owned institution, would turn down
the money which the contract called for.

He then an·

swered his own question by observing that this was an
extremely valuable piece of property, and accepting the
money would simply return to Beneficial Life Insurance
Company the money which they originally loaned upon
the property, together with interest at the agreed rate,
and would deny to them the windfall.
Is he really saying that Beneficial Life Insurance
Company is motivated by ordinary, old fashioned, every·
day greed, and covetness? Is this really a study in human
behavior which reveals the lengths to which people will
go in constructing fictions .and pretenses in order to gain
a windfall at the expense of another person? Is this a
study of the morals of certain church-owned institutions
and the people who run them and make their de·
cisions? Have we forgotten that in this case, the courts
who hear such matters sit as courts of equity and not
courts of law? Have we forgotten that courts of equity
are charged with insuring justice? Have we forgotten
that in order to seek equity, a plaintiff must first do
equity, or in other words come into court with clean
hands? Does this type of subterfuege, do these pretenses,
does this covert attempt to obtain a windfall reflect the
appellant's definition an<l understanding of "equity'?"
Has the world gone completely mad?
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H, assuming, arguendo, the appellant denies or questions the equities, where are the affidavits which place
at issue the values set forth in respondant's affidavits?
(Sec page 199 of the principal record)

If appellants t?..ke issue with facts established by
affidavits, they have the perfect right to file opposing
affidavits. If the values set forth in respondant's affidavits are not true, where are the opposing affidavits?

POINT XI.
A PERSON SEEKING A FORFEITURE MUST
SERVE THE NOTICES ON THE PARTY WHO
OWNS THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME THE
NOTICES WERE SERVED.
The subject property was sold to C. Dwayne Harrison
in December 1967. He paid for it with an interest in a
data-processing bureau which he had previously owned
with his brother. Respondant and Mr. Harrison worked
closely in a number of projects for about a year and a half
and then split up.

In May, 1969, when respondant and Mr. Harrison
split up, respondant reacquired the property from Mr.
Harrison.
Mr. Harrison was m actual, physical possession of
the property during the entire period of his ownership.
Utilities were furnished to him, obviously, in his own
name and on his own account.
Appellant was told repeatedly about Mr. Harrison's
ownership, possession, and occupancy. It is, indeed
possible that appellant didn't understand. For nearly
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two years, appellant's agents didn't listen to anything or
read anything which would distract them from the pursuit of their major objectives. Mr. Harrison's ownership was open, notorious, and obvious, and not secret and
covert like appellant tried to make it look to Judge Croft.
They talk about proof. The affidavits which accompany the motions for summary judgement establish this
fact beyond question. Appellant has, understandably,
never undertaken to controvert any of them. Because
they are not controverted, they are to be considered to
be proven facts.
The appellants urge the court to grant a forfeiture
because the person on whom they did serve some defective and insufficient notices acquired the property
during the course of the litigation.
Are they really serious? Do the seven cases which
they cite stand for such a proposition? Do any cases
stand for such a proposition?
POINT XII.
THE RELEASE RESPONDANT EXECUTED HAS
NO REVELANCY TO ANY ISSUES
IN THIS LAW SUIT.
Appellant has made a big production out of a release
signed hy respondant and his wife. It is set forth ver·
batim on page 2 and 3 of the appellant's brief. But why?
What does it have to do with this law suit?
What does it mean to appellant to be released? What
1s appellant's definition of release? Is a release an act
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of forgiving? Or is it some magical document which
changes facts?

If a person has a car accident and injures someone
needlessly and negligently, the injured party has a claim.
If the tort feasor makes .an acceptable settlement with
the injured party, the injured party releases him, in
other words forgives him. In forgiving the tortfeasor,
no-one claims that the accident didn't happen or that the
injury wasn't sustained. One simply says that in spite
of the facts of the accident and the injury, the injured
party will make no further claim.
A release is simply an act of forgiveness.
Now if the tortfeasor who caused the injury also had
a contractual duty to convey a piece of property to the
injured party, and does in fact convey it on the same
day he obtains a release, does the conveyance have anything
to do with the tort? or the forgiveness of the claim for
damages for the tort? or the antecedent duty to convey
the property? Do such obvious principles have to be explained?
One need only to read first the complaint .and then
the release. The release releases the tortfeasors therein
from "the alleged wrongful foreclosure or other grievence
or cause of action or problem whatsoever in connection
with the taking of title and forclosure procedure proceedings by (the tort f easors) etc." These things are
torts. They fall under the conunon-law causes of action
of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and are
torts. Nothing else.
Now admittedly, there were other causes of action
in case no. 174076. These other causes sought to enforce
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Beneficial Life Insurance's agreement to reinstate the
mortgage. An .action for specific performance is an action
in equity. Actions for damages for torts are actions at law.
Beneficial Life Insurance finally decided to perform
its contractual duty and to reinstate the mortgage. A
person never releases another person from per/ orming
something that person has per/ormed. When a duty is
performed, there is nothing left to release. The per.
formance ipso facto extinguishes the duty to perform,
and extinguishes ipso facto the cause of action seeking
to coerce the performance.

Why do such simple concepts get so muddled up?
POINT XIII.
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
HAS NEVER MADE ANY ELECTIONS AT ALL
IN THIS CASE, AND ELECTIONS MADE BY
MR. GREENE, OR OTHER UNNAMED PERSONS
INTERESTED IN BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMP ANY ARE NOT ACTS OF THE
CORPORATION.
All corporations are legal fictions. Beneficial Life Insurance Co. is no exception. Corporations have no soul,
no Id, no alter ego, no mind. Corporations can only act
act through agents. These agents are styled directors.
The overt acts of the agents .are recorded in the minutes
of the directors meetings.
The minutes of the directors meetings have been ex·
amined and they show that this corporation has never
ever done one overt thing with respect to the subject
property.
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Now admittedly, this authority can be delegated. But
the delegation itself requires an overt act on the part of
the delegator. The only overt act that can be found is
m the by-laws, quotel earlier in this brief.
But assmning the board of directors has done enough
overt things to delegate some of the authority to someone named in the by-laws. The first thing that we must
examine is the person to whom the authority is delegated.
That person is the Chairman of the Board. Now if he
is absent, the delegation falls to the vice chairmen. If
they .are absent too, it falls to the President.
But there is another problem. The delegation 1s
limited. It gives the delegatee authority to preside at
stockholder and director's meetings and to have the general supervision of the ministerial affairs of the company.
This doesn't say anything about forfeiting $30,000.00
equities, or terminating contracts, or pursuing windfalls.
Ministerial affairs are the little things that a corporation
has to do to keep going. Now maybe the concept of bigness and littleness is a relative concept and maybe the
pursuit of a $30,000.00 windfall is a little thing to appel·
lant, hut judging this question by the energy the appelant
has expended, it is a big thing to Beneficial Life Insurance Company, too.
But there is still another problem. The mantle of
this delegated authority, whatever it is, falls upon the
chairman of the hoard. Where is the evidence that he
made an election? If he is absent, it falls upon the chairmen, whoever they are. Where is the evidence that any
of them made an election? If they are all .absent, to·
gether with the cairman, it falls on the president. Where
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is the evidence that he made an election? W11ere is the
evidence the chairman was ever absent?
More importantly, where is the evidence that any of
them made any elections at the time (or times) and
under the circumstances, and upon the conditiu•:. is they
were entitled to make them?
The record shows some confusing minutes of the ''home
office committee" and "loan committee", but the minutes
of the directors meetings and the by-laws don't even
show that these committees, whatever they are, even
exist. This part of the record can be disregarded as being
informal socializing at the home office.
POINT XIV.
THE ADDENDUM TO THE CONTRACT AND
THE PERFORMANCE OF MR. HARRISON
THEREON DEFEATS THE FORFEITURE AND
MAKES EVERY OTHER ISSUE MOOT.
The addendum has already been set forth. The piv·
otal words in the addendum ,are "at any time" The
addendum clearly states that 16 (a) remedies shall not
be available at any time after the judgment note has
been paid. The payment and performance is not in dis·
pule. It was performed by Mr. Harrison two days after
the notice of October 21st, 1968 was served on respondant.

If the English Language were a limited language and
if simple concepts were difficult to express, one might
be justified in reading implied restrictions into simple
words. "Any" means "any" and not something else. Other
adverbs are available if something other than "any" is
meant. But instead of using alternate adverbs, people
. "
usua II y mo d1'fy " any. " P cop1e can say " a Imost any time

so

or can s.ay "any time up to " or "any time until", or "any
time except". But the addendum doesn't say any of these
things. It says simple "any time" Now what else can be
said about something so simple. It means any time without
any restrictions or limitations whatsoever.
Judge Croft didn't need to decide that point. The
appellant's case was too we.ak on other points. But if the
Supreme Court should disagree with Judge Croft and
not find the other points so fatally weak, it would seem
that this issue alone would be dispositive of the case.
What else can be said about a contract which has an
addendum which takes away all forfeiture rights upon
payment, which may be made at any time, and about a
record which evidences undisputbly that the payment
referred to therein was actually made? Is there really
any other issue to decide?
POINT XV.
APPELLANT'S NOTICES WERE TOTALLY
INSUFFICIENT.
While this point should be fully expanded and explored, this brief has already approached its allowable
length. What needs to be said about this point has
already been said. On pages 191 through 197 of the
principal record, there is a memorandum prepared and
filed by respondant for Judge Croft. Pages 192 through
195 address themselves to this point and appellant incorporates that argument herein by reference thereto. A
flow chart explaining what steps may be taken by appellant, in what sequence they must be taken, and when
they may be taken is included in the appendix to this
brief, which is prepared .and filed as a separate volume
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because of the length. Point one of the argument on
page 191 of the brief addressed to Judge Croft is not a
valid point. Respondant should not have urged it, since
respondant was clearly in error, but point two in that
brief is very much in point and is incorporated herein
by reference. Things must be <lone in their proper order,
and the strict requirements of forfeiture must be meticulously complied with if appellant expects to prevail.
Appellant must w.ait until the contract is 30 days in
default. This appellant did.
At the end of that time, appellant may make some
choices. Since there is no evidence of any overt corpor·
ate action, it is questionable whether it made that choice,
but assuming arguendo that it did, it must proceed either
under A, or B, or under C, or elect to proceed at all.

If it proceeds under A, it must serve a notice that
the contract is in default, and demand that that default
be be remedied within 5 days. That is all the notice is
supposed to say. Appellant's notice goes further and
advises respondant what it intends to do at the end of
the 5 days. That is well and good, but it is surplusage,
and can be disregarded. It might even invalidate the
notice. After all, the appellant might change its mind
within the 5 days and either decide to do nothing, or
proceed to remedy B, or proceed to remedy C.
At the end of the five days, if there has been no
response to the demand, appellant may make a new
choice. The s.ame doubt exists on the question of this
choice as on the question of the earlier choice.

If the corporation makes that choice, which it is
only entitled to make if there is no response, then it
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must serve notice of that election. It is not entitled to
annc1pate the non-performance, or rely upon an earlier
st:itement of what it, five <lays earlier, intended to do.
At that point, the respondant, might be in unlawful
detainer status, but since this never occured, there is
no point in pursuing that any further.

If the respondant were in unlawful detainer status,
the statutory notices come into play, but that is all moot
since the requisite notices up to that point were never
giv(;n and since the performance by Mr. Harrison under
the terms of the addendum short-stopped the play anyway.
Appellant's comment on the alleged notice set forth
on pages 12 and 13 of appellant's brief has no significance. First of all, it is disputed that it was sent.
hut procedurally, the notice is not proper subject matter
for consideration, either at this level or at the trial court
level. Now here in the pleadings is the notice mentioned.
When both appellant and respondant filed motions for
summary judgment, no mention was made by appellant
of that notice. If it was to be an operative fact it should
han been ple.aded in the complaint, or at least established by affidavit attached to appellant's motion for
summary judgement.
This mysterious document makes its first appearance
long after the motion for summary judgment were argued
and after briefs were submitted. Mr. Greene, attached
to his reply brief, .an affidavit which had attached to it
the mysterious letter of May 27, 1968. This is far too
late for any consideration at all, and should be disregarded, but even if it were not disregarded, it doesn't add
anything or lend anything to appellant's case.
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Its purport is to obtain the abatement of some weeds
that were prevelant in the neighborhood during the time
adjoining and adjacent lots (not belonging to either appellant or respondant) were vacant and frequently overgrown with weeds. While it is denied that there was
any significant growth of weeds, if there was, they were
promptly cleared. The rest of the letter can simply be
regarded as Mr. Greene's own interpretation of what the
e.arlier notice accomplished, which of course is highly
debatable, and which is one of the issues presented on
this appeal. It certainly does not purport to be the new
notice of the new election which appellant might have
been able and entitled to make, but did not.
POINT XVI.
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ITS RIGHTS TO
FOLLOW UP ITS NOTICES JANUARY 12, 1968.
Judge Croft has said all that needs to be said about
this, and appellant .adopts Judge Croft's argument on
page 8 of his opinion which is to be found on page 215
of the record as his own argument.
CONCLUSION
Judge Croft, amazed at the contentions of appellant,
expresses wonderment why plaintiff refused to accept
a $7 ,000.00 tender and suggests that the plaintiff was
more interested in the forfeiture than the other remedies.
He perceptively observes that the existence of a very
substantial equity in the property in favor of respondant
suggests why. (See page 9 of the opinion at page 216).
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His very astute comment sums up what this law suit
is all about, and once the court has seen through ap·
pellant's charade, everything else has an easy explanation.

i

Legally, however, appellant's biggest area of miscomprehcnsion is in the contract provisions. Appellant has
created two bins and tried to toss all of the cases into one
bin or the other. Actually there are three bins. One
is for self-executing contracts. There are two types of
selJ-executing contracts. Forrester vs. Cook belongs in
the the first bin. The rest of the cases, except the Van
Zyverden case belong in the second bin. The Van ZyYerden case and the Beneficial Contract belong in the
third bin.
This, of course, is a classification in terms of the
contract provisions. Should the contracts he considered
in terms of other differences, the Beneficial-Respondant
contract is in a class all by itself. What other forfeiture
threatened a $30,000.00 equity, for instance? What other
contract has an addendum?

In spite of everything appellant urges, there is no
theory upon which appellant can maintain a case, and
. its case should die quietly .and gracefully in light of its
multiple anomolies and defects.
I

I

Respectfully submitted,
Isl John E. Dennett
1243 East 21st South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Forrester vs Cook
137, 292 p 201'-, 1930)

u

Facts: On May 19, 1924 Diana Forrester, as seller and Harry F. Cook
and a Mr. Noyes, as buyers, entered into a contract under the terms of which
the seller agreed to sell and the buyer agreed to buy the Ivy Apartment in '
Salt Lake City, Utah. The purchase price was $17, 100. 00. The buyer was
given $3, 000. 00 credit for the pre -existing mortgage on the premises,
which the buyer agreed to assume and
The buyer was also given
$2, 420. ll credit for equities in two pieces of undescribed real estate
transferred from the buyer to the seller. The deferred balance of $11, 579. 89
was payable in quarterly installments of $3 00. 00.
The contract contained this self-executing provision:
"In the event of a failure to make any payment when the same shall
become due or within 60 days thereafter, the seller shall be released
from all obligations in law and equity to convey said property, and
buyer shall forfeit as liquidated damages all payments which have
heretofore been made on this contract. .•• the buyer becoming at
once a tenant at will of the seller. 11
All quarterly payments (of $300. 00) were made untii November,
192 7 (apparently 13 of them). After one extension from its original undis closed due date, the Walker Bank mortgage became finally due on October 11,
1927 and was not paid. Disputes arose over irrelevant matters and seller
on January 28, 1928 served on the buyer a notice in this words:
"You and each of you will further take notice that by reason of
your failure to make the payments hereinbefore referred to,
you· and each of you under the terms of said aereement have become
and now are and are hereby declared to be the tenants at will of
Diana Forrester; and as such you and each of you are hereby required
to vacate the property .••• and surrender possession thereof to
said Diana Forrester within five days from the date of the service
of this notice upon you. 11
The buyer failed to comply with the notice and on January 21, 1928 (?)
(the date seems to be in error) the seller commenced an unlawful detaineraction. Prior to trial, the buyer disclaimed any interest in the property,
and tendered pos se_s sion to seller.
The question went to trial on the issue of damages and attorney fees.
The trial court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an attorney
fe;el and, ultfr.c,atdy, that damages of $9i0. 00, which enc court re:iused to
treble, should be· allowed. The court struck buyer's counterclaim.
Both buyer and seller appealed.

The Supreme Court held:

(1) No attorney fees will be allowed in an unlawful detainer action

where it does not purport to enforce, but rather to avoid the agreement.
(2) A counterclaim in an unlawful detainer action cannot be filed.
_
(3) There was no. competent evidence {in the record) on which to base
darnages.
The court remanded for a retrial, but gave son")e helpful dictum. In
ex?,minin;; the ·vo:cdir.g of this particular co:'.ltr::!.c:t,
cou:-t observed
the agreement ipso facto and automatically made the bc.yer tenants at will
of the seller upon failure to comply with the terms of the conti·act, {and other
dictum not helpful here.)

BRIEF

Leone vs Zuniga
(84Utah417, 34P2d G'7'J, 1934}
Facts: On an undisclosed date (presumably in 1926) Leone as seller
and Zuniga as buyer, entered into a contract under the terms of which the ,
seller agreed to sell and buyer agreed to buy undisclosed property in Salt
Lake County for the agreed consideration of $6, 900. 00. The buyer was
credited $1, 750. 00 down payment by reason for a conveyance to seller of
other property. The balance of $5, 150. 00 was to be paid in monthly installments of $45. 00 beginning March 20, 1926.
The contract contained this language:
"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by
buyer or upon failure to make any payments when the same shall
become due, or within 60 days thereafter, the seller shall, at
his option, be released from all obligations in law and equity to
convey said property and the buyer shall forfeit as liquidated
damages, all payments which have been made .
• the buyer
11
becoming at once a tenant at will of the seller.
No notices were served.
The evidence showed, without
that the Zunigas were in
default. The trial court ruled that the contract was cancelled and forfeited
and that the seller was entitled to $250. 00 attorney fees.
The buyer, on appeal, alleged that it was necessary for the seller
to allege and prove notice of forfeiture. (Other error, not ;relevant here,
was also a?signed.)
The Supreme Court, in ruling on this issue, distinguished be tween
self-executing and non- self:...executing type contracts. It held that notice
is a pre-requisite when the terms are not self-executing and that it maI
not be a pre-requisite when the terms are self-executing. It cited
Bergman vs. Lewis (68 U 178, 249 P 470) as an example of a contract where
the contract was self-executing and notice was not necessary, and Howorth
vs. Mills (62 Utah 574, 221P165) where it was not self-executing and notice
was required.
The Supreme Court found the Leone-Zuniga_contract unlike Bergman
vs. Lewis and like Howorth vs. Mills.
2634
Rationaie: ln non-self-executing contracts, the seller merely gains
the right to make elections u'pon the buyer's default. He may elect to stand
upon his right to declare a forfeiture, or may elect to waive the forfeitur·e
and elect to enforce the contract
to its terms. The object of the
language is to give the vendor an election. If he wants to avail himself
of his right to avoid the contract, he must make an unequivocal election
evidencing that intention. A contrary rule would place the buyer in a
dilemma. If he vacates the premises, he may be confronted with an action
to enforce the contract. If he fails to vacate, he may be n:et with a suit for
possession.
Held; Reversed and with instructions to sustain the buyer's demurrer.
Since the contract was not self- executing a notice was required and since it
was not given and not alleged, the complaint failecl to state a cause of action.

BRIEF

vs Guild
(101 Utah 313, 121 P 2d 401 1942)
On an undisclosed date in 1935, John Christy etux as seller, and
Edward L. Guild etux as buyer, entered into an agreement according to
the terms of which the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to
buy property in Salt Lake County for $3, 200. 00. The buyer paid nothing
down and undertook to pay the entire purchase price in deferred monthly
installments of $20. 00 for six months, then $25. 00 for the next six months,
then $30. 00 per month until the entire balance was paid.
The contract provided that upon the buyer's default, the seller might
elect to terminate the contract and retain the payments made as liquidated
damages, the buyer becoming a tenant at will of the seller.
On April 30, 1940, the installments were $130. 00 in arrears and the
sellers served notice on the buyers (paraphrased) as follows:
Unless the arrear_s of $130. 00 are brought 'current, the
improvements are made to the property and the taxes and
insurance of $297. 20 are paid before May 12, 1940, the
contract would be terminated, and the payments rnade would
be retained as liquidated damages and the buyers would be
a tenant at will of the sellers.
On May 15, 1940, a notice to quit was served on buyers.
The buyers failed to comply with the notice to quit. The sellers sued
for restitution of the premises and for damages. Before institution of the
suit, the buyer tendered $130. 00 but did not tender payment of the $297. 20
taxes and insurance and did ·not make the agreed improvements.
The buyer did not raise any of_ the usual questions on appeal, such
as the sufficiency of the notice. The buyer simply questioned (1) whether
the question of default should have been submitted to the jury and (2)
whether in light of the equities, reimbursement should not be made for
the improvements made and the large amount paid (1/ 3 of the principal)
(plus interest) on the contract.
The court held on the first point. {l) That the lower court did not
err in directing a verdict, since there was no dispute on the question of a
default.
The oourt held on the second point (2j that che propercy had produced
$75. 00 per month income which over a period of five years and had more
than reimbursed the seller, not only for his monthly installments, but
$2 I 000. 00 in imprOVem entS and that the forfeiture Of the monthly payments
was not, on the facts of this case, a penalty.
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BRIEF

Pacific Development vs. SLewa.rl
(ll3 Utah 403., 195 P 2d 748 1948)
On an undisclosed date, Pacific Development, as seller, entered into
a contract with J. P .. Stewart etux, as buyers, according to the terms of
which the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to buy property
in Provo, Utah for $5, 900. 00. The buyer paid $100. 00 down and uncle rtook
to discharge the deferred balance of $5, 800. 00 in monthly installments
of $55. 00 .
The contract contained the following fanguage:
"Ln the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the
buyer, or upon the failure to make any payments when the same
shall become due or within 20 days thereafter the seller shall
at his option be released from all obligations in law and equity
to convey said property
• • the buyer coming at once a
tenant of the seller. 11

After multiple defaults there was an arrearage· of $557. 50 on
October 24, 1946. On that date the seller gave notice that unless the
arrearage was paid in full within seven days, the seller (would) elects
to declare the entire contract forfeited.
On November 12, 1946, a notice to quit was served. By that notice
the defendants were given an additional five days in which to pay the past
due obligation. They were unable to do so (and did not do so).
The trial court held that the 23 day notice was unreasonable.
The Supreme Court held that 23 days was a reasonable time, and
since up until the time of trial they had not cured the default and the buyers
had not paid the equivalent of the rental value of the property ($55. 00 per
month) for the time they had occupied the property, and since .there was
doubt as to whether the buyer could have cured the default even if given
additional time, a forfeiture should be allowed and a writ of possession
should be issued.

BRIEF

Fuhriman vs Bissegger
(13 Utah 2d 379, 375 P 2d 27, 1952)
On an undisclosed date in 1946, Festus Fuhriman, as seller, entered
into a contract with Alfred Bissegger and LaRene Bissegger as buyers
according to the terms of which the seller agreed to sell and the buyers
agreed to buy for an undisclosed price. No down payment is mentioned
and no monthly payments are set forth, although it is intimated that the
payments were to be $10. 00 per month.
The contract provided that if the buyer failed to make the payments
as they came due, the seller, at his option,. could forfeit the buyers'
rights to take possession of the property.
The seller let the buyer remain in possession almost 14 years with
virtually no payments.
The seller served no notice of his election and in 1960 commenced
a suit for possession.
The buyer counterclaimed for specific performance. The trial
court granted specific performance provided all amounts -due under the
contract were deposited within 60 days.
The Supreme Court held that since there were no notices, there
was no forfeiture and the counterclaim for specific performance should
be granted.

f"
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BRIEF
Jacobsen vs. Swan
(3 Utah 2d
278 P 2d 294 1954)

The opinion says that on or about June 27, 1947 (which appears to be
erroneous) a Mr. Neilson offered property in Orem, Utah for sale through'
Dixon Real Estate for $14, 000. 00. A salesman for the company found a
willing buyer who had a $4, 000. 00 down payment. Since the down payment was
inadequate to satisfy Mr. Neilson, the salesman, Emil Jacobsen, advanced
$10, 000. 00 and combining it with $4, 000. 00 received from the prospective
purchasers {the Swans) paid Mr. Neilson cash for the property.
The new title owner (the Jacobsens) then, as seller, entered into
ari agreement with the Swans, as buyers, according to the terms of which
the sellers agreed to sell the subject property for $14, 000. 00. The buyers
paid $4, 000. 00 down and agreed to pay the deferred balance of $10, 000. 00
in monthly installments of $80. 00.
The contract provided that
at their option would be released
that all payments made would be
buyers would be come tenants at

in case of buyer's default, the sellers
from all obligations to convey the property,
forfeited as liquidated
and the
will of the sellers.

On March ll, 1947, the buyers were in default, and after notices the
original agreement was superseded by a· lease agreement under the terms of
which the buyers became the lessee of the seller who became lessors.
One Hundred Dollars per month was to be paid, $80. 00 of which would be
"rent" and $20. 00 of which would be credited to the accrued arrearage of
$889. 41 under the contract. If the buyers did not default on the lease, the
parties agreed to revert to the original agreement.
On June 27, 1950 still another lease was entered into, superseding
the lease of March 11, 194 7. The lessees were to pay $3 00. 00 on or before
August 31, 1950. This $300. 00 was paid, but on March 5, 1952 the lessees
were in default again.
On March 5, 1952, lessor served lessees with unconditional notice
to quit, requiring the defendants to quit the premises by March 31, 1952.
Nothing happened. On August 12, 1952 a similar notice to quit was served
requring the lessee to quit the premises by September 15, 1952.
The lessors sued in unlawful detainer. The trial court awarded
possession of the property to the lessor, but required the lessor to
account for the sums paid under the original contract but not under the
two subsequent lease agreements.
The trial court found that the pay1nents
on the original contract was $3, 190. 00 more than the rental value of the
property.
The Supreme Court held that under the original contract the lessees
were entitled to a credit of $3, 190. 00; under the first lease the lessees were
entitled to a credit of $480. 00 and under the second lease agreement the
lessor was entitled to $1, 246. 62 plus $600. 00 for the lessee's hold-over,
giving the Swans a net judgment of $1, 823. 38.

BRIEF

Van Zyverden vs Farrar
(15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P 2d 4681964)
On an undisclosed date, presumably in 1960, the Farrars, as sellers,
entered into an agreement with the Van Zyverdens, as buyers, according to
the terms of which the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to buy
certain property known as the Daniels Creek Ranch for an undisclosed
price and on undisclosed terms.
The contract provided that for buyer's failure to make payments
when due, the
at his option, would have certain alternative remedies
including:

*

"* Upon failure of the buyer to remedy the default within five
days. after written notice, to be released from all obligations and
forfeit all payments as liquidated damages, the buyer becoming
at once a tenant at the will of the seller.* *"
'

In November, 1961, the Farrars assigned their interest to Seagull
Investment Co. On November 15, 1961 Seagull made demand on the buyers
for the first annual payment. Seagull gave notice on January 3, 1961 to '
the buyers to remedy the default in five days or quit the premises. On
January 16, 1962, Seagull brought an action for
.

-

1

On February 10, 1969, Seagull caused another similar notice to be
served.
On :february 13, 1962, Seagull
filed a
in an earlier
•
I
'
action brought by the Van Zyverdens ,against them.·
Without making any comment on the notice of January 3,, 1961 and the
ac;tion commenced on January 16, 1962 based there upon# the· court held
that the notice of February 10, 1962 was inadequate because it was
•
f
served after the action had been commenced.
I

\

The Supreme Court held .this to be a contest, saying that whether
such a cause of action exists is to b.e determined at the time the action
I
is commenced.

\±.
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UNIFORM REAL

CONTRACT

(e.Ct . . \

1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this
15th.
dayho{ S el_)tf'emb_e_r_ _ _ , A. D., 19_6_0_,
Ralph
W.Farrar
and
Helen
R.
r'arrar,
e
by and between :_::_:_=-:.:_::_:__ ___:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - " -i-s- -WJ.
----:---'-'---------hereinafter designated as the Seller, andL_e_Q__.Ya,n Zyverden and Sytske van Zyverden'
as 'oint tenants and not as tenants in common with full r i ht of'
.
.
t:>alt Lake City
ta
hereinafter designated as the

vo

P

2 .. WITNESS ETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buye.r,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate m

the county of ____¥lasatch

.

.

More particularly described as follows:

, State of Utah,
City Utah R • .it'.
Southeast Quarter of' the
t.
7 , 'l'owns h.1p 4 uOU
'-' th , uange
....
5
ec ion

'ihe

s·

D.

Box #140.
Quarter of'
Ea t
S , <.!alt
w

Lake Meridiano
Also, Beginning a t the Southeast Corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 5 East, 'Salt Lake Meridian, thence West
chains, thence North 25 chains, thence East
chains, thence South
25 chains to the beginning.
.
Also, The Northwest Quarter and the Northeast Quarter.of the Southwest
Quarter of' Section 22, Township 4 South, !!ange5 East, ::>alt Lake Meridi
See Attached Rider hereto.

6

6

$60 1 000-.-Sixty thousand - ------------ --:..-------------------Dollars($ 60 ,ooo.- )
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order
in Ogden ·Utah
·
O
3. Said

hereby agrees to enter into pos.scssion and pay for said described premises the sum of

strictly within the following times, to-wit:

five

-

.

500 . -

·

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 5 5 '000 • -

6%

($-------

shall be paid as follows:

$2750.- or more, plus i n t e r e s t of
per annum on or before Nov.lst.1961
and $2750.- or more plus
i n t e r e s t per annum ·.on the .unpaid balance,
every November 1st. each year thereafter u n t i l l paid in f\111.

6%

-,

,

.-f. if;"'

.)

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the

day of

,/)v:r c.j; a

4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first 'tio

principal. Interest shall be charged from

0 eptem

'

September

, 19 60 •.

'CJS()terest and second to the reduction of the

er

on all unpaid portions of the

purchase price at the rate of
6
per cent (
6 !" % ) per annurfi. The Buyer, at his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principa1 or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made.
·
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment froin the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
·

..ls(/"

6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligatldn

$

22 ,ooo

-

, as

of

property in favor of M.R.i•1lchelsen

s eptemeb_er ___ th.1960

with an unpaid balance of

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said pr_operty, except the following
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and main_tain Joans secured by said5rope,rty of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed

OI

6

percent

(
% ) per annum and payable in regular
installments; provided that the
installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loaiis shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. \Vhen the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said !ender an:.! hereby ::;;c:c' t.o c,pply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and Llay 0ne-:._1: the expenses necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller z.gr.::eing to pay the other one:-haH, P<vVit:L..; !ichnc'nci, ,;,,,.t the monfoly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and inteN>st r:ite as outlined above.
1 L 'The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and n:il.ure which arc or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller herd>y covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:
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3535 South
City, Utah
on or about the 3rd day of

19G2 Seagull
you a docwnent entitled

Iavestr.tent Cor '3.1iU1y did cu.use to be served

"ifot.;_ce of Ternination of Contr2.ct c:.nd Five day Notice .·to Vacate Prer:d.ses 11 ,
a

of w:ueh is
reference thereto

hereto as exhibit

A11 2.nd mc:de a part hereof

11

fully as if all of the terms thereof ,.,ere spelled

out herein.in detail, and
• ',/l{S={E.'..S, you fo.ilcd to cor,:rily with s<d d

default under tllc ten1s of the contract

c.nd to

your

tllCreto and h;:i_ve f;iilecl,

neglected ;.:_nd refused to v:acate and surrender s<:dd premises.
HO'! Ti.::E:EFOJ.'3, you &.re hereby notified that

if for 2.ny re.:::.son

to ten:'inate your occupancy of the preL:ises &tmcxed hereto &s

the

2.s aforesaid

\vci.S

for any reason ineffecti_ve, that you arc

not:i_ficd th.::.t you rnust vacate said 9r'eidses uit;hin five (5) days

<dtcr service of ti1is notice ui)on you and that if you fail 'so to do, th2t
,,,ill t:1crcaftcr be guilty of tmlawful det<..iner of said nre;-:ises in
1953
<.ccorcLncc '.·:itl1 the )revisions of 78-36-3(2)/and related st<.tntcs and t:12.t

;'0!1

you \rill be 15able for three t51nes the dc..n;ages assessed in 2.ccord2.ncc u:i th

of 78-36-10, UC/.. , 1953 and related statu.tes;

the
in no

j

ti1<..t this notice

affect the existing legal proceedings now :-icndin['; conccri1in:-;

l1e1 ..;::_11 111c11t5_oncd.

C.
for s·c.:c'=ull Invcstit1cnt Co11"!any, :->r,70 Soiith State Street,
Lz. L:c C:i ty, Ut<c·.11
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